인터넷 전문 전자상거래 기업의 수익성에 대한 의구심이 증대됨에 따라 이들에 대한 투자는 급속히 위축되었다. 일부 전자상거래 기업들은 통신판매를 겸업하거나 오프라인 상점을 개점하기도 했다. 이러한 상황에서 순수한 인터넷 전문 전자상거래 기업이 살아남기란 매우 어렵다.
인터넷 전문 전자상거래 기업이 살아 남는 길은 기존의 대형 유통기업이 채워줄 수 없는 부분을 공략한다는 이미 귀에 익숙한 전략 밖에는 없어 보인다. Etoys가 Toys”R”Us에 대적할 수 없고, Amazon.com이 Wal-Mart를 이길 수 없듯이 인터넷 전문 전자상거래 기업이 대형 유통기업에 정면도전한다면 결코 살아남을 수 없다.
800.COM은 이 점을 잘 알고 있는 전형적인 기업이다. 기존 대형 유통기업들의 온라인판매 사이트는 고객 서비스가 부실한 경우가 많다. 가전제품 판매업체인 800.COM은 가전제품시장의 온라인 부문에만 집중하여 완벽한 서비스를 제공한다. 1천억달러 규모의 가전시장에서 10억달러는 1%에 해당할 뿐이지만, 800.COM이 이 1%를 모두 차지할 경우 회사의 규모는 10억달러가 되는 것이다.
사실상 기존의 대형 유통기업들이 인터넷 전문 전자상거래 기업들의 시장 잠식을 저지하기는 어렵다. 인터넷 기업들을 망하게 하기란 더더욱 어렵다. 오히려 기존 유통기업의 인터넷 사이트와 인터넷 전문 전자상거래 기업은 서로 제휴하여 부족한 점을 보강할 수 있다. Toysrus.com과 Amazon.com의 제휴가 좋은 예이다.
(원문)
E-Commerce Report: Internet Merchants Adapt to Survive
By BOB TEDESCHI
At the end of 1999, the e-commerce industry was talking, ad nauseam, about the coming shakeout. Pundits foretold a year in which cluttered e-tailing categories like pets and drugs would be winnowed down to one or two strong companies that could do battle with the Web operations of traditional bricks-and-mortar retailers.
Those who championed the bricks-and-clicks approach went one step further in 2000, arguing that true multichannel retail success could be achieved only by adding catalog divisions, as well.
The result of such Wall Street wisdom was, of course, not so much a consolidation among so-called pure-play Internet retailers as it was a decimation. Even as customers continued to flock online for purchases, investors, doubtful that e-tailers could ever turn a profit, fled so quickly that Internet merchants had little means of shifting course as prospects for profitability were dimming.
Now, with so many e-tailing companies heading for the exits, and others adding catalogs or building traditional stores, one question for 2001 is whether any pure-play Internet merchants will survive intact. According to industry executives and analysts, few, in fact, will. And those companies that do hang on will look profoundly different from the predictions of 12 months ago.
Ken Cassar, a senior analyst with Jupiter Research, said that the conventional wisdom these days about Internet-only merchants was beginning to sound familiar.
"The only real chance for pure plays is in niches that are underserved by a big bricks- and-mortar retailer," Mr. Cassar said. "Interestingly enough, that's what everybody was saying in 1995."
After that, of course, investors started to believe that every online retailer in every category could become Amazonian in its scale. "The problem is, no amount of money can manufacture a profitable mass merchant" Mr. Cassar said. "It takes time to buy market share and reach profitability."
He said the Internet-only merchants "who sell discrete products or serve a narrow niche stand a chance, but those who go head- to-head with a mass merchant are dead in the water."
"EToys versus Toys "R" Us? Forget it. Amazon.com versus Wal-Mart? No way."
As for whether the traditional retailers could eliminate the niche online merchants by creating competing Web sites, Mr. Cassar said, "I doubt traditional retailers would concentrate on a niche because it wouldn't move the needle on revenues as much as other things they could do in the mass market."
Niche online retailers are hoping Mr. Cassar is correct. According to Greg Drew, chief executive of 800.COM, which sells consumer electronics from its base in Portland, Ore., "When it comes to bricks and mortars and our business, it's not an us-or-them type of thing."
Although the $100 billion consumer electronics market hardly sounds like a niche, Mr. Drew said his company was aiming only at the online portion of that market and only at consumers who were looking for a full- service online merchant.
While many other online retailers sell goods like DVD players and home-theater systems, Mr. Drew said few offer extensive customer service to help customers find the products to suit their needs.
That level of service, he said, has allowed 800.COM to attract brands that few online merchants carry, like Sony and Pioneer. And, Mr. Drew said, the traditional merchants with online stores have little interest in pursuing such a high-cost customer-service model. "We won't significantly hurt them, and they won't significantly hurt us," Mr. Drew said.
"We have tremendous respect for what they do," he continued. "But there's one thing true about us: we're experts about selling online. And there are a lot of unique characteristics about this channel, with hidden potholes ?some marketing, some technical, most a blend of both. So if we can only do 1 percent of this market ?and they can't stop us from doing that ?we'll be a billion- dollar company."
Indeed, those with mass-merchant experience indicate that it is difficult enough to sustain a Web operation geared toward their existing market, much less an operation that allows them to seek and destroy niche Internet players.
"There's no question that a bricks-and-clicks brand has advantages, but it doesn't mean you automatically succeed on the Web," said John Barbour, chief executive of Toysrus.com.
This year, Toysrus.com struck a partnership agreement with Amazon in which Toysrus.com handles purchasing and Amazon handles merchandising and fulfillment on a so- called co-branded Web site. In a sense, the battle between the traditional and virtual companies resulted in a draw.
The difficulty of fulfilling orders for toys in a timely fashion was one reason Toysrus.com ceded that part of its operation this year to Amazon.com. And the difficulty of handling the purchasing operations for toys, analysts said, was the chief reason Amazon chose that route.
So to handicap the race between a bricks- and-mortar giant and an Internet-only specialist in this category ?or others ?means looking beyond simple distinctions of virtual and traditional. "You have to step back and get into the basics of that particular business and its customers," Mr. Barbour said.
Lauren Cooks Levitan, an analyst with Robertson Stephens, an investment firm, agreed with that assessment, as well as with Mr. Cassar's opinion that niche online merchants will have the best chances at long-term survival. Moreover, she said, the type of growth they will need to strive for will be much different than that prescribed by dot-com executives last year.
"You always want to be more targeted anyway if you're cash-constrained, which is what these companies are," Ms. Levitan said. "Last year, investors were overlooking the fact that there's no shortcut to building a brand, and a consumer relationship.
"Does it mean they can't be meaningful, profitable businesses?" she asked. "No. But it means they have to grow more organically, just like offline. The pure plays aren't all going to die."
On the other hand, she added, "we actually now run the risk of underestimating them."
Sources : The New York Times, December 18, 2000
인터넷 전문 전자상거래 기업이 살아 남는 길은 기존의 대형 유통기업이 채워줄 수 없는 부분을 공략한다는 이미 귀에 익숙한 전략 밖에는 없어 보인다. Etoys가 Toys”R”Us에 대적할 수 없고, Amazon.com이 Wal-Mart를 이길 수 없듯이 인터넷 전문 전자상거래 기업이 대형 유통기업에 정면도전한다면 결코 살아남을 수 없다.
800.COM은 이 점을 잘 알고 있는 전형적인 기업이다. 기존 대형 유통기업들의 온라인판매 사이트는 고객 서비스가 부실한 경우가 많다. 가전제품 판매업체인 800.COM은 가전제품시장의 온라인 부문에만 집중하여 완벽한 서비스를 제공한다. 1천억달러 규모의 가전시장에서 10억달러는 1%에 해당할 뿐이지만, 800.COM이 이 1%를 모두 차지할 경우 회사의 규모는 10억달러가 되는 것이다.
사실상 기존의 대형 유통기업들이 인터넷 전문 전자상거래 기업들의 시장 잠식을 저지하기는 어렵다. 인터넷 기업들을 망하게 하기란 더더욱 어렵다. 오히려 기존 유통기업의 인터넷 사이트와 인터넷 전문 전자상거래 기업은 서로 제휴하여 부족한 점을 보강할 수 있다. Toysrus.com과 Amazon.com의 제휴가 좋은 예이다.
(원문)
E-Commerce Report: Internet Merchants Adapt to Survive
By BOB TEDESCHI
At the end of 1999, the e-commerce industry was talking, ad nauseam, about the coming shakeout. Pundits foretold a year in which cluttered e-tailing categories like pets and drugs would be winnowed down to one or two strong companies that could do battle with the Web operations of traditional bricks-and-mortar retailers.
Those who championed the bricks-and-clicks approach went one step further in 2000, arguing that true multichannel retail success could be achieved only by adding catalog divisions, as well.
The result of such Wall Street wisdom was, of course, not so much a consolidation among so-called pure-play Internet retailers as it was a decimation. Even as customers continued to flock online for purchases, investors, doubtful that e-tailers could ever turn a profit, fled so quickly that Internet merchants had little means of shifting course as prospects for profitability were dimming.
Now, with so many e-tailing companies heading for the exits, and others adding catalogs or building traditional stores, one question for 2001 is whether any pure-play Internet merchants will survive intact. According to industry executives and analysts, few, in fact, will. And those companies that do hang on will look profoundly different from the predictions of 12 months ago.
Ken Cassar, a senior analyst with Jupiter Research, said that the conventional wisdom these days about Internet-only merchants was beginning to sound familiar.
"The only real chance for pure plays is in niches that are underserved by a big bricks- and-mortar retailer," Mr. Cassar said. "Interestingly enough, that's what everybody was saying in 1995."
After that, of course, investors started to believe that every online retailer in every category could become Amazonian in its scale. "The problem is, no amount of money can manufacture a profitable mass merchant" Mr. Cassar said. "It takes time to buy market share and reach profitability."
He said the Internet-only merchants "who sell discrete products or serve a narrow niche stand a chance, but those who go head- to-head with a mass merchant are dead in the water."
"EToys versus Toys "R" Us? Forget it. Amazon.com versus Wal-Mart? No way."
As for whether the traditional retailers could eliminate the niche online merchants by creating competing Web sites, Mr. Cassar said, "I doubt traditional retailers would concentrate on a niche because it wouldn't move the needle on revenues as much as other things they could do in the mass market."
Niche online retailers are hoping Mr. Cassar is correct. According to Greg Drew, chief executive of 800.COM, which sells consumer electronics from its base in Portland, Ore., "When it comes to bricks and mortars and our business, it's not an us-or-them type of thing."
Although the $100 billion consumer electronics market hardly sounds like a niche, Mr. Drew said his company was aiming only at the online portion of that market and only at consumers who were looking for a full- service online merchant.
While many other online retailers sell goods like DVD players and home-theater systems, Mr. Drew said few offer extensive customer service to help customers find the products to suit their needs.
That level of service, he said, has allowed 800.COM to attract brands that few online merchants carry, like Sony and Pioneer. And, Mr. Drew said, the traditional merchants with online stores have little interest in pursuing such a high-cost customer-service model. "We won't significantly hurt them, and they won't significantly hurt us," Mr. Drew said.
"We have tremendous respect for what they do," he continued. "But there's one thing true about us: we're experts about selling online. And there are a lot of unique characteristics about this channel, with hidden potholes ?some marketing, some technical, most a blend of both. So if we can only do 1 percent of this market ?and they can't stop us from doing that ?we'll be a billion- dollar company."
Indeed, those with mass-merchant experience indicate that it is difficult enough to sustain a Web operation geared toward their existing market, much less an operation that allows them to seek and destroy niche Internet players.
"There's no question that a bricks-and-clicks brand has advantages, but it doesn't mean you automatically succeed on the Web," said John Barbour, chief executive of Toysrus.com.
This year, Toysrus.com struck a partnership agreement with Amazon in which Toysrus.com handles purchasing and Amazon handles merchandising and fulfillment on a so- called co-branded Web site. In a sense, the battle between the traditional and virtual companies resulted in a draw.
The difficulty of fulfilling orders for toys in a timely fashion was one reason Toysrus.com ceded that part of its operation this year to Amazon.com. And the difficulty of handling the purchasing operations for toys, analysts said, was the chief reason Amazon chose that route.
So to handicap the race between a bricks- and-mortar giant and an Internet-only specialist in this category ?or others ?means looking beyond simple distinctions of virtual and traditional. "You have to step back and get into the basics of that particular business and its customers," Mr. Barbour said.
Lauren Cooks Levitan, an analyst with Robertson Stephens, an investment firm, agreed with that assessment, as well as with Mr. Cassar's opinion that niche online merchants will have the best chances at long-term survival. Moreover, she said, the type of growth they will need to strive for will be much different than that prescribed by dot-com executives last year.
"You always want to be more targeted anyway if you're cash-constrained, which is what these companies are," Ms. Levitan said. "Last year, investors were overlooking the fact that there's no shortcut to building a brand, and a consumer relationship.
"Does it mean they can't be meaningful, profitable businesses?" she asked. "No. But it means they have to grow more organically, just like offline. The pure plays aren't all going to die."
On the other hand, she added, "we actually now run the risk of underestimating them."
Sources : The New York Times, December 18, 2000
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